The Empty Quarter

Here’s a recent analysis by Jane Novak from over at Armies of Liberation. I have no qualms with much of the underlying information within the analysis; however, as often happens with analyses, we have disagreements in interpretation. I have a problem with the certainty expressed in the Saleh-Zawahiri connection. I haven’t seen any reliable evidence that the Yemeni government, Ali Abdullah Saleh or anyone closely tied to the regime has had any significant relationship or conducted negotiations with al-Qaeda central per se… At least not since 2000. This is not to say that relatives with troublesome associations do exist within the large Ahmar clan – most from the early Afghan Arab/Civil War days, such as Ali Mohsen - but thisis something different.

The supposed deal between Saleh and Zawahiri relies on a  single quote by a “senior intelligence official” quoted at Long War Journal. The quote, however, takes advantage of the conflation of jihadist groups, and is actually rather ambiguous when placed against the broader history of the use of mujahidin by the regime. An explicit agreement between Zawahiri and Saleh is never mentioned, only the implication of a quid pro quo arrangement.  I also question the assertion that the Yemeni government is not seriously engaged in countering AQ-AP. I think this remains to be seen, and recent events argue otherwise. The regime does negotiate with jihadist groups when it suits them, that has been fairly well established in the past. However, this is on a domestic, even regional level. This is partly out of history and habit, and partly out of necessity - the country lacks the capacity or authority to mount what would be needed to rid the country of jihadist groups and supporters, or to attain stability without them.

Negotiation and containment strategy is not particular to this administration, nor is using Islamists and jihadists for political ends. The Turks and the British both negotiated with the tribes as suzarains throughout their occupations. in the 1960s and 70s Islamist groups were regularly used to fight ideological and geographical battles. The YAR used “mujahidin” to fight against South Yemen and its National Democratic Front. The Islamist Front sprung from this relationship, carving out a place for hard-line Islamo-tribal alliances and armies within Yemeni politics ever since. The government attempted to fold these elements into the formal political system – with limited success - in the 80’s and 90’s, while allowing others to join the jihad in Afghanistan. In the 1994 war, Yemen again called on the tribal mujahidin - many of whom were returning from the Afghan front - to fight against the YSP, again with success.

Cutting across this narrative and muddying the picture was the emergence at the time of the international terror network of al-Qaeda - posted just across the Red Sea in the Sudan, and recruiting from the returning Afghan veterans. At first, the Saleh government was oblivious to the implications of an al-Qaeda network within their sphere – not realizing the change in ideology and political goals the evolution represented. Hence ta number of misguided decisions, including the release of bin Attash in 1999, as reference in Jane’s article, and others. It took multiple attacks until the regime finally felt the repercussion of the larger al-Qaeda agenda. The bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 had devastating economic ramifications on the Port of Aden. The Cole attack marks an awakening, a turning point in the Yemeni government’s policy in differentiating and dealing with jihadists.

After unification, the Northern regime welcomed back the tribal Afghan Arabs into the South to counter the socialists – a return to their traditional role. In this way, the emergence of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (A-AIA) and the relationship with al-Fadhli was not unnatural. What was different were the expanded alligences the A-AIA may have harbored – their al-Qaeda links. There has been much debate about just how connected to al-Qaeda the A-AIA was. I personally have not seen any convincing evidence of strong ties, although links are bound to exists, as relationships within the memberships existed. Perhaps the best way to differentiate and untangle terror networks and jihadist movements is to consider each organization’s political agenda and motivations. A-AIA was primarily a domestically focused organization, even a regionally focused one. Abu Hasan al-Mihdhar was a Yemeni, al-Fadhli is a Yemeni, al-Nabi is a Yemeni. none of them are really al-Qaeda - although their political motives sometimes overlap and they may have been funded at times by al-Qaeda patrons. To the extent that A-AIA members were loyal to al-Qaeda, such loyalties would come as compliment to A-AIA goals.

To point out Saleh’s relationship with A-AIA members like al-Fadhli and al-Nabi is not to paint him with al-Qaeda as much as with Yemeni Islamist tribal fighters – domestic mujahidin.

As for the catch-and-release policies of the Saleh government, everything seems to point to a strategy of separating the wheat from the chaff; distinguishing the domestic, tribal elements from the rest. Following release, a tribal fighter vary well may be utilized in the traditional way – to fight the regimes enemies. If a jihadist has significant ties to a tribe, there is a chance he can be collared through that tribe. The government attempts to talk him from his broader al-Qaeda agenda and allegiances, into a more traditional role. The AQ-AP letter from leadership to membership attained by News Yemen, whether authentic or not, argues for this view. The AQ-AP leadership, aware of the regimes history, is trying to exploit the past reliance on domestic jihadists to fight its battles. The preference of 1994 veterans (in other words, those of the pre-al-Qaeda days) further supports this.

This is all a far cry from a policy of negotiating with al-Qaeda leadership in AfPak or Iran for the release of operatives of AQ-AP or its priors. Doubtless, this policy is not foolproof. It is likely that al-Qaeda members have fought alongside other Yemeni Jihadist in all the recent domestic fronts. But an explicit agreement to supplement the Saa’da wars with AQ-AP or Jund, does not seem probable to me. For one, there is no reason to believe that Yemen doesn’t have enough of its own mujahidin for the task. Secondly, there is no evidence that al-Qaeda has the numbers of reliable fighters in jail to make much of a difference. The vast majority of “al-Qaeda” prisoners in Yemeni jails most likely occupy the murky ideological middle-ground of allegiances – those that Yemen thinks it can “reform”,  and for whom a pledge might hold some weight in tribal code - like the recent 170.

As far as the regimes reluctance to crack down on AQ-AP, I haven’t seen this play out yet either. They may be able to negotiate a truce; however, I think this is doubtful. AQ-AP has not been shy – It has daringly announced its intentions, practically offering a target list. And it has yet to make good on any of its promises. The one area a negotiation may be possible is with the new rhetoric regarding Palestine and the Somali front. If Yemen can enter into a sanctuary agreement in exchange for keeping Yemeni targets off their list, such a deal may be plausible.

As for Jane’s assessment, definitely worth a read. You decide.

Yemen strikes multifaceted deals with al Qaeda

By Jane Novak

February 11, 2009

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh recently struck a deal with Ayman Zawahiri, and Yemen is in the process of emptying its jails of known jihadists. The Yemeni government is recruiting these established jihadists to attack its domestic enemies as it refrains from serious counter-terror measures against the newly formed Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The tripartite relationship between the Yemeni regime and al Qaeda enables all participants to further their goals at the expense of national, regional, and global security.

Yemen releases 95 jihadists

News reports from Yemen detail a meeting in Sana’a between President Saleh and a number of so-called reformed jihadists late January. The militants demanded freedom for imprisoned associates. A presidential committee identified 170 jihadists eligible for release, and 95 were released Saturday. Other reports indicate that authorities have cleared for release a total of 300 of the 400 total suspected al Qaeda in prison.

In the latest round of negotiations, Saleh reportedly asked the militants to engage in violence against the southern mobility movement. The southern uprising is bent on achieving the independence of South Yemen and is a substantial threat to Saleh’s grip on power. Tariq al Fahdli was present at the meeting, and at a later meeting in Abyan, militants brandished an official order directing the military to supply the mercenary group with arms and ammunition. Fahdli fought alongside bin Laden in Afghanistan and has been accused of complicity in the 1992 Aden hotel bombing, the first al Qaeda attack that targeted American troops. Fahdli’s sister is married to Brigadier General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, President Saleh’s half brother and a recruiter for bin Laden in the 1980s.

President Saleh deployed Fahdli and other Afghan Arabs against southern Socialists in 1994’s civil war. Some bin Laden loyalists were rewarded with high positions in the administration and military after the 1994 civil war. More recently, General al Ahmar incorporated Sunni extremists into military ranks during the 2004-2008 Saada War against Shiite “Houthi” rebels. Militants legitimize both the 1994 and Saada deployments by referencing the “apostate” nature of the enemy. This task is made easier by the official media’s description of both Socialists and Shiites as satanic.

The deployment of al Qaeda extremists as a government paramilitary affords the jihadists training, experience, contacts, financial benefit, and the ability to dictate to the regime and indoctrinate followers. Many are awarded military salaries and official positions. After years of integrating militants into Yemen’s security forces and bureaucracy, aspects of the state have been co-opted by extremists.

Direct negotiations between the Yemeni president and al Qaeda operatives grew out of Yemen’s “Dialog Program” established in 2002. Through discussion of the Koran, the program sought to gain assurances that jihadists would not launch assaults within Yemen but said nothing about the Islamic legitimacy of attacks on US troops in Iraq. The program ran until 2005 and was described by some participants as an expedited release program.

In 2005, President Saleh began openly negotiating with the jihadists. One such negotiation in 2006 was conducted by Saleh and the head of Yemen’s Political Security Organization. The jihadists’ representative was Rashad Mohammed Saeed (Abu al Feida), formerly a major figure in al Qaeda and the Taliban who has been seen in videos near Osama Bin Laden.

Saeed later described the outcome of the meeting with Saleh. “It was also agreed to cancel measures imposed on those who are released, like house arrest, the monthly signing of official register and taking permission if you wish to go another province in Yemen,” he said. In 2006, Saeed praised Yemen as “the best country” to deal with militants and noted “The Yemeni government will not enter open confrontations with Mujahideen.”

President Saleh has also arranged state jobs, cars, cash payments and even weddings for militants who pledged to follow the regime’s dictates. Officials spin these negotiations as fostering rehabilitation and integration into society.

In January 2008, a spokesman for an al Qaeda cell in Yemen said the government had recruited some of its members to fight in the Saada War. In exchange, the security forces agreed to “ease the persecution of (al Qaeda) members.” Ahmed Mansour said the group is and has been in contact with the government through intermediaries, adding bin Laden ordered a ban on attacks directed against the regime and that the US remains enemy number one. Other al Qaeda insiders who reference bin Laden’s prohibition on assaults against Saleh’s government include Nasser al Bahri (Abu Jandal), bin Laden’s longtime bodyguard, and Rashad Saeed.

Al Qaeda Central

Another prong of President Saleh’s tripartite relation with al Qaeda is with the group’s central leadership, thought to currently be in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Yemen supplied thousands of recruits to the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, and Yemenis were among the top ranks in the organization, as well as forming the core of personnel who were guarding, feeding, and transporting bin Laden. Saleh welcomed thousands of Yemeni and non-Yemeni jihadists from Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviets. Ayman Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden frequently visited and preached in Yemen in the 1990s and have many loyalists among Yemeni government ranks.

A long-standing pattern of negotiation exists. After al Qaeda operative Khallad bin Attash was arrested in Yemen in 1999, bin Laden contacted a Yemeni official and bargained for Attash’s release. The Yemeni regime released Attash and promised not to confront al Qaeda. In exchange, bin Laden pledged not to attack the government. Attash later went on the play a role in the USS Cole bombing. Another round of negotiation appears to have taken place 2003 in which regime concessions resulted in immunity from attack.

A current agreement between Yemen’s President Saleh and the al Qaeda terror group was referenced in a report here at The Long War Journal detailing communication between Ayman Zawahiri and President Saleh after September’s embassy attack. A US military official reported that “Saleh feared his government would be the next target, but Zawahiri wanted al Qaeda prisoners released from Yemeni jails and committed al Qaeda foot soldiers to fight the Houthi rebels.”

Active Jihadists

Although Yemen formally joined the US-led War on Terror after the Sept. 11 attacks, the Yemeni regime has facilitated jihadists’ efforts externally, sheltered fighters internally, and repeatedly misled the US about their whereabouts and status. In early 2007, a Yemeni newspaper tallied 1800 Yemenis who traveled to Iraq for jihad; their families said the young men were trained by top level Yemeni military commanders.

Yemeni courts fail to criminalize attacks on US troops or civilians abroad. In a 2006 trial of 13 jihadists who fought in Iraq, the court found that it is not against Yemeni law to murder foreign nationals in “occupied” Muslim nations. Although the defendants admitted to fighting US and Iraqi forces, they faced no judicial penalty and were convicted only of document fraud.

Yemen refuses to extradite or imprison the al Qaeda operatives convicted of the terror attack on the USS Cole. President Saleh has been equally lenient with those convicted of attacks on tourists and oil facilities. Several were granted “house arrest” after escaping from prison. Yemen’s banking system lacks the legal framework to criminalize terrorist financing.

Some analysts assert that some of the terror attacks since 2006 were orchestrated by Yemen’s security forces in a bid to manipulate international perceptions or overshadow domestic political crises. One of Yemen’s most wanted terrorists, Hamza Ali Saleh al Dhayiuani, said “I am ready to prove the reality that some attacks were planned in co-ordination and agreement of the Political Security and its agents to gain foreign support.”

In November 2008, Al Quds Al Arabi carried an interview with a former terrorist in Yemen who was described as “very close to al Qaeda”. The senior jihadi reported that the terrorist organization has entered a “positive phase” in planning an attack against the US that will “outdo by far” Sept. 11. Al Quds Al Arabi previously published bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa against the US. The Yemeni former operative reported that he is contact with the current leaders of the organization in Yemen who in turn receive messages from bin Laden.

Al Qaida groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia formally merged operations in January, under the name al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The group announced the merger at a press conference attended by a single journalist, Abdulea Shaya, employed as a researcher by the state news agency, SABA. The group was acknowledged by Ayman Zawahiri in a statement. AQAP is based in Yemen. Its leader is a Yemeni, Nasser al Wahishi, who was a close associate of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. AQAP vowed to strike at Western interests and supply routes across the region. The new group and its broad goals appear to be a strategic development on the part of al Qaeda Central in furtherance of its global strategy.

The stated goals of AQAP mirror an April 2008 statement by Al Qaeda’s central leadership which said establishing naval terror cells and control of the seas around Yemen is a “vital step” in achieving a global caliphate. The Bab al Mandeb waterway and Gulf of Aden were termed “of supreme strategic importance” in al Qaeda’s long-term plan. The April statement highlighted the attacks on the USS Cole in 2001 and the French tanker Limburg in 2002 in Port Aden.

In response to the formation of AQAP, Saleh’s regime made several announcements of its intent to find the group’s hideout. Saleh called on tribal leaders and citizens to turn in the militants. Officials accused the opposition parties of supporting al Qaeda in an attempt to overthrow the state. Security forces set up checkpoints, engaged in hunting activities, and beat a man named al Zaheri because his name was similar to the al Qaeda chieftain’s.

AQAP issued a communiqué explaining the unique configuration to its local members and legitimized fighting for the state by referencing the 1994 war. A copy of the letter was obtained by News Yemen. Echoing the earlier agreement by Saleh and Zawahiri late in 2008, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula explained to its followers that President Saleh wants jihadists to fight on behalf of the state, especially those who did already in 1994, against the enemies of unity– southern oppositionists. AQAP in return will gain prison releases and unimpeded travel to external theaters of jihad, the letter explained.